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Abstract This paper considers an emerging practice whereby citizen’s use of ubiqui-
tous and domesticated technologies enable a parallel form of criminal justice. Here,
weaponised visibility supersedes police intervention as an appropriate response. Digital
vigilantism is a user-led violation of privacy that not only transcends online/offline
distinctions but also complicates relations of visibility and control between police and
the public. This paper develops a theoretically nuanced and empirically grounded
understanding of digital vigilantism in order to advance a research agenda in this area
of study. In addition to literature on vigilantism and citizen-led violence, this paper
draws from key works in surveillance (Haggerty and Ericsson, British Journal of
Sociology, 51, 605–622, 2000) as well as visibility studies (Brighenti 2007; Goldsmith,
British Journal of Criminology, 50(5), 914–934, 2010) in order to situate how digital
media affordances and cultures inform both the moral and organisational dimensions of
digital vigilantism. Digital vigilantism is a process where citizens are collectively
offended by other citizen activity, and coordinate retaliation on mobile devices and
social platforms. The offending acts range from mild breaches of social protocol to
terrorist acts and participation in riots. The vigilantism includes, but is not limited to a
‘naming and shaming’ type of visibility, where the target’s home address, work details
and other highly sensitive details are published on a public site (‘doxing’), followed by
online as well as embodied harassment. The visibility produced through digital vigi-
lantism is unwanted (the target is typically not soliciting publicity), intense (content like
text, photos and videos can circulate to millions of users within a few days) and
enduring (the vigilantism campaign may be top search item linked to the target, and
even become a cultural reference). Such campaigns also further a merging of digital and
physical spaces through the reproduction of localised and nationalist identities (through
‘us/them’ distinctions) on global digital platforms as an impetus for privacy violations
and breaches of fundamental rights.
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1 Introduction
In 2013, Gary Cleary hanged himself in Leicestershire, UK after being pursued by
Letzgo Hunting, an online group that exposes suspected paedophiles. Likewise, in
2015, Walter James Palmer faced global outrage including numerous death threats after
being identified as the killer of a beloved lion in Zimbabwe. Both individuals were
targeted by a clandestine form of criminal justice: digital vigilantism (DV). DV is a
process where citizens are collectively offended by other citizen activity, and respond
through coordinated retaliation on digital media, including mobile devices and social
media platforms. The offending acts range from mild breaches of social protocol (bad
parking; not removing dog faeces) to terrorist acts and participation in riots. These
offensive acts are typically not meant to generate large-scale recognition. Therefore, the
targets of DV are initially unaware of the conflict in which they have been enrolled.
This vigilantism includes, but is not limited to, a ‘naming and shaming’ type of
visibility. This typically involves sharing the targeted individual’s personal details by
publishing them on a public site (‘doxing’), including sensitive details such as the
target’s home address, work details as well as financial and medical information. The
nature and source of this information may vary greatly, and may also implicate family
members and associates. Such weaponised visibility is an example of citizens leverag-
ing digital media for particular socio-political ends (Castells 2012). These ends include
conventional justice through police or other legal channels, as well as unconventional
justice such as online harassment and petitioning the target’s workplace in order to
terminate their employment. The visibility produced through DV is unwanted (the
target is typically not soliciting publicity), intense (content like blog posts, photos and
video evidence can circulate to hundreds of thousands or even millions of users within
a few days) and enduring (the vigilantism campaign may be the first item to appear
when searching the individual’s name, and may become a cultural reference in its own
right). DV can be fuelled by the circulation of misinformation (Starbird et al. 2014),
such as when a target is misidentified as a suspect or offender. Moreover, there is
evidence that such falsehoods circulate with greater volatility than truthful details
(Lotan 2012). Yet it is also the accuracy and ease of collection and circulation of
personal details that stands as a troubling factor when assessing DV’s societal
consequences.
While DV does not supplant conventional vigilantism, it is informed by such
practices alongside a broader digital media culture that privileges user-generated
content and communities as forms of ‘engagement’ and ‘empowerment’. Likewise, it
is informed by how digital media users engage with civic practices, notably in their
policing of online spaces, as well as broader engagements with police and state actors.
To this end, any distinction made between ‘users’ and ‘citizens’ when appraising DV
campaigns warrants scrutiny. These factors mark a conceptual departure from conven-
tional vigilantism, and as such must be considered as a matter of definitional concern.
For example, lowered barriers to publishing and online coalescence imply that we can
expect to find a broader range of political views expressed through DV campaigns. Yet
there is also evidence to suggest that the digitalisation of vigilantism will facilitate a
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reproduction of law and order politics and conservative social views found in conven-
tional vigilantism (Schneider and Trottier 2012).
This paper reconsiders contemporary surveillance and visibility on digital media in
light of the emergence of digital vigilantism. While surveillance is conceptually linked
to top-down impositions ranging from Bentham’s guard tower to Snowden’s revela-
tions about the Five Eyes intelligence regime, user-led surveillance practices may
supplement or even contest such regimes. Following scholarly accounts of
sousveillance (Mann et al. 2003) and surveillant assemblages (Haggerty and Ericson
2000), the relationship between ‘big brother’ and ‘little sisters’ warrants further scru-
tiny. Through DV, a more distributed network can be enrolled to identify targets,
sidestepping privacy settings and legal safeguards through the efforts of willing social
actors. One of the core challenges in approaching DV is to arrive at a cogent under-
standing of this phenomenon while resisting ‘the easy reification and reductions of
vigilante activity’ (Burr and Jensen 2004, p. 143). This paper returns to literature on
vigilantism as well as related sub-fields to consider how its features are either
reproduced or transformed through digital media. The following section considers
these definitional concerns, and is followed by conceptual overviews of three interre-
lated perspectives towards understanding how emerging forms of vigilantism force a
reconsideration of surveillance practices. DV is a product of digital media platforms
and user-generated cultural practices. It is also an enactment of citizenship that both
contests and reinforces forms of state power and policing. Finally, DV is a matter of
rendering a targeted individual visible, with implications for surveillance studies.
2 Definitional Concerns
DV is represented in news media as a series of high-profile incidents that reflect an
ideal type (Mann 2011; Madrigal 2013; Booth 2013), but it is also connected to a
broader tendency that is informed by media logics and manifest as a set of practices that
reflecting one or many features of an ideal type. As stated above, DV is a form of
mediated and coordinated action. Its point of departure is moral outrage or a general
sense of offence taking, typically towards an act that has been captured and transmitted
via mobile devices and through social platforms. In response to this offence taking,
users seek to render a targeted individual (or category of individual) visible through
information sharing practices such as assembling and publishing their personal details
(‘doxing’). This response is typically led by individuals who may temporarily coalesce,
for example, on a Facebook group, but are otherwise unaffiliated with a formal
organisation. DV campaigns are driven by a range of criminological motivations,
including responding to criminal events as well as the prevention and deterrence of
potential transgressions. For example, the 2011 Vancouver Riot Facebook group
justified its coordinated action as identifying suspected rioters, but also claimed ‘this
page is as strong a deterrent you will find to prevent this from happening again’
(Vancouver 2011). Yet DV campaigns also pursue informational goals such as the
identification of a targeted individual or category of individual, as well as articulating
an understanding about shared norms and values, and consequently expressing a
mediated collective identity that may be informed by national, religious or ethnic forms
of solidarity.
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At this exploratory stage, it is possible to distinguish between cases (a) that are
wholly excluded from police work, and those that may (indirectly) inform police and
state actions, (b) that are restricted to a regional context, and those that are not tethered
to offences in a particular region, (c) that involve exclusively digitally mediated
responses, and those that also include embodied actions such as visiting a target’s
residence, (d) that are largely presented as socially beneficial in public discourse, and
those that are framed as harmful, (e) that are one-off responses not linked to an
enduring socio-political movement, and those that emanate from established move-
ment, and (f) that allow the targeted individual to communicate with digital vigilantes
on mediated platforms, and those that exclude targets from participation. It is also
possible to distinguish between cases (g) that follow relatively high-profile offences
such as terrorist acts or riots, and those that in response to more mundane infractions
such as bad parking or poor transit etiquette. We may expect that by virtue of the nature
of the offending acts and the motivation of DV participants as well as other social
actors such as the news media, the former would generate a greater amount of content
and visibility in a comparatively limited period of time, but that this content may
quickly be removed from social platforms due to legal, ethical and moral reasons
(Reddit 2015). While evidence of such campaigns may be removed, news media
coverage will likely remain, and will include information about individual targets and
their alleged offending acts. In contrast, campaigns that target comparatively mundane
offences may exhibit all or many of the same characteristics of vigilantism, but with
participants and critics expressing less concern for privacy and proportionality.
In order to speculate in which ways DV departs from conventional embodied
vigilantism, we may return to Les Johnston’s (1996) six elements of vigilantism and
consider how each of these features is reinforced, augmented or contested through
digital media. First, there must be some degree of planning and premeditation on the
part of instigators, such that an act of spontaneous self-defence would not be considered
as vigilantism. While this remains the case with DV, digital media affordances greatly
facilitate comparatively spontaneous coordination, such that material, spatial and
temporal barriers are obviated. Second, Johnston identifies private voluntary agency
as a core requirement. In other words, vigilant agents must be distinguished from police
and state actors, as well as private entities which nevertheless ‘function within the legal
ambit of the state’ (ibid., 225). With DV, the relationship with police is complicated, as
the latter may make appeals to the public for information that may trigger vigilante
responses (as in the Kopschopper case in the Netherlands, where a group attack on a
youth was captured by CCTVand circulated to the public), or may otherwise make use
of data collected by DV efforts. These developments are far from the first instance of
police-public cooperation, yet digital media facilitate a repurposing of police appeals or
content for extrajudicial goals. In addition, private entities such as social platforms are
arguably complicit actors in DV campaigns insofar as they facilitate such coordination.
Third, conventional vigilantism is understood as a form of ‘autonomous citizenship’
(ibid., 226) whereby citizens engage in self-protection within a given territory. As DV
in practice connects embodied incidents (e.g. offences within a given jurisdiction) with
a communicative realm that exceeds that territory, we may consider that the notion of
citizenship is complicated, though not necessarily ruptured. Fourth, vigilantism in-
volves the (threatened) use of force. While DV initiatives may contribute to embodied
violence, its key tactic is a form of cultural violence (Galtung 1990) that simultaneously
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renders targets visible and legitimates accompanying forms of violence, including the
structural foreclosure of life chances (Gandy 2009). Fifth, Johnston notes that vigilan-
tism ‘arises when some established order is perceived to be under threat from the
transgression (or potential transgression) of institutionalized norms’ (1996, p. 229).
Once again, with DV, the ability to oversee other geographic and cultural contexts
greatly complicates the practice of asserting a singular established order. In other
words, DV is less a matter of policing a local public space with local norms, but rather
a fusion of localised publics with cross-contextual information sharing practices and
norms that are manifest on digital platforms. Sixth, vigilantism serves to assert personal
and collective security by providing ‘the assurance that an established system of order
will prevail’ (ibid., 231). While this may remain the case with DV, we may question
how the boundaries of the collective are asserted.
Following this brief overview that is summarised in the following table, Johnston’s
six features appear to be generally upheld. Yet the way these features are manifest
through digital media amounts to a re-articulation of the boundaries of the collective
(Table 1).
In considering the emergence of DV from conventional vigilantism, it appears that
the further mediatisation of such campaigns imposes a number of consequences,
notably in terms of how citizenship and policing are re-articulated in context that
merge localised environments with deterritorialized platforms (Harvey 1989). What
follows is a review of recent relevant literature in areas of vigilantism, crime media
culture and online policing, in order to advance an understanding of DVas the practice
of citizenship through user-led surveillance. These overviews will in turn inform an
understanding of DV’s weaponisation of visibility as an area of concern for surveillance
studies.
3 Digital Media Affordances and Cultural Practices
DV is situated with a broader media culture of users being able to organise online
(smart mobs, crowdsourcing), amongst an expansive and ever-asserting informational
infrastructure (big data, smart cities), and may facilitate social harms (cyber-bullying,
revenge porn, cyber-stalking, online harassment). The range and characteristics of DV
is partly informed by these conditions, while often also being articulated as a response
Table 1 Key features of conventional and digital vigilantism
Conventional vigilantism (Johnston 1996) Digital vigilantism
Planning Premeditation Facilitated spontaneity
Private agency Distinguished from state and
corporate actors
Possible connections with
state and corporate actors
Autonomous citizenship Self-protection Asserting new boundaries
Use of force Embodied Visibility as weapon
Reaction to crime/deviance Threat of established order Fusion of local and mediated
norms
Personal and collective security Policing localised territory Mediated policing
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to the above harms. DV is facilitated by a lowered threshold for coordinated action on
digital platforms that is often manifested through crowdsourcing initiatives (Slavkovik
et al. 2015). The convergence of formerly distinct social spheres on platforms such as
Facebook and Twitter offer new organisational possibilities, but also lack of control
over the scope and severity of a campaign by any single social actors. Lowered
threshold for mediated intervention means that attempts to reproduce offline commu-
nity often falter, either failing to elicit support or vastly exceeding boundaries and a
proportionate response to a perceived offence. These possibilities are governed by
media logics associated with social platforms (van Dijck and Poell 2013; Altheide and
Snow 1979), alongside discursive formations of smart cities and big data, as well as
broadcast media representations of crime and citizen participation (Huey et al. 2012;
Rose and Fox 2014). These contribute to what Lanier (2006 in Dennis (2008, p. 354))
identifies as the ‘strange allure of anonymous collectivism’.
Digital media such as social platforms and mobile devices allow for an amplification
of peer-to-peer communication, providing greater access to personal information as
well as allowing the circulation of such information. This has shaped practices such as
file-sharing, fundraising and political mobilisation. Indeed, online mobilisation is an
emergent phenomenon that crosscuts digital media platforms and collective behaviour
(Shirky 2008; della Porta 2013). Recent examples include members of social news
platform Reddit sending dozens of pizzas to a 2-year-old cancer patient in 2013, as well
as two spontaneous campaigns to reverse the dramatic price rise of Daraprim and
cycloserine, two drugs respectively prescribed for treating HIV and tuberculosis. The
former campaign notably prominently featured the identification and shaming of
Martin Shkreli a hedge fund manager who initiated the price jump. In these cases,
individual social actors effect social change, and bypass typical state and media
channels in the process, while relying instead on privately run social media platforms.
Contemporary interpersonal culture is shaped by the ability to monitor and intervene
in the lives of others (Andrejevic 2007; Niedzviecki 2009). Social platforms like
Facebook, Twitter and Reddit allow citizens to discuss a targeted individual, publish
their personal details and issue calls for action. In addition, mobile devices such as
smart phones enable real-time recording and transmission of an offending act to other
citizens. Previous research considers the crowdsourcing of surveillance practices on
digital media (Trottier 2013a), as well as the changing nature of policing and visibility
online (Trottier 2012a). These research streams suggest that bottom-up forms of
organisation are facilitated by social platforms and that policing is changing as a result
of digital media, which in turn shapes how these technologies are used. What remains
to be investigated is how user-led surveillance practices intersect with police and
institutional monitoring of digital media. DV occurs in a cultural context where users
are coming to terms with the relation between online activity and offline consequences.
While the ‘early web’ was characterised by a perceived distinction between online and
offline in terms of the exercise of power (Jordan 1999), the emergence of social, geo-
located and ubiquitous media has led to a dissolution of this distinction, to the extent
that digital media activity can have lasting consequences in both local and global
contexts. Thus, DV participants may not be aware of the actual impact of their actions
(Ronson 2015). It is also important to note that DV is as much a communicative and
mediated act as it is a collective enactment of social order. In other words, vigilantism
on digital media can be framed in the context of online communication: the sharing of
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personal details, photos and videos, adding commentary, discussion and calls for
action. However, all of these actions culminate in a coordinated mass persecution of
a targeted citizen.
Emerging affordances with digital media inform changing cultural expectations and
practices by users, and in particular a renegotiation of the perceived appropriateness of
the disclosure and circulation of other citizen’s personal information. Concepts such as
sharing (Meikle and Young 2012), but also privacy and proportionality, are necessarily
reconsidered. Sites that rely on user-generated content are now amongst the most
popular on the web. The fact that users embrace these services suggests that they are
drawn to information their peers give and give off (Goffman 1959), and are occasion-
ally compelled to provide their own content. Users clearly value the interpersonal
benefits of new media technologies (Ellison et al. 2007), even if these benefits are part
of a persistent campaign from software, hardware and telecommunication companies to
generate demand for their platforms and services (Mosco 2004). Yet an increase in
online sharing of personal information—as evidenced from the growth of services like
Facebook, Twitter and Instagram—contributes to DV, as they provide both a platform
and a set of practices that render DV meaningful and practical.
The meaning underlying ‘social’ in social media is a conceptual quagmire, yet the
social connectivity they offer is a germane point of departure. Social media is shorthand
for ‘social convergence media’, in that these services can bring together formerly
discrete fragments of users’ everyday life, leading a collapse of sociocultural contexts
(Marwick and boyd 2011). Media boundaries determine behavioural patterns, and
converging media will ‘foster integrated behavioural patterns’ (Meyrowitz 1990, p.
94). The act of converging formerly distinct behavioural patterns can amplify DV if
behaviour in one context is deemed objectionable and actionable in another. This
connectivity is framed in a broader cultural context of network sociality, where
professional and personal spheres increasingly overlap (Wittel 2001). Social media
sites are a means to consolidate users’ social lives and identities, both of which have
typically remained fragmented. The Internet used to be treated as a space that was
distinct from the offline world. Now, the distinction between online and offline is
largely obviated (Jurgenson 2012). The contemporary web connects formerly distinct
sections of users’ lives. This connection is even more pervasive with the prominence of
mobile devices allowing users to submit and access content virtually anywhere. This
convenience means that sharing may supersede reflecting. While users may exert a
temporal buffer between reflection and presentation on social media (Davis 2010), this
reflection is likely contextualised with a particular audience in mind. The fact that this
imagined audience might not be the entire audience indicates how social media
communication can facilitate DV.
Whereas the early web was understood in terms of anonymity and freedom from
discrimination, the rise of social media has several features that suggest a closer and
more complicated relation between individual users as well as institutions. These in
particular result in a preponderance for online stigma (Trottier 2013b), as well as a
compromised personal reputation (Solove 2007). Yet even if comparatively removed
from an embodied setting, the early web was also characterised by practices of self-
policing (Huey et al. 2012), whereby users asserted the boundaries of acceptable
conduct. Though traditionally contained to the monitoring and policing of online
conduct, social platforms and mobile media in particular render embodied acts and
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infractions visible as well, and subject to collective editorialising and intervention
through DV. For example, a Facebook group entitled Dublin Bad Parking (https://
www.facebook.com/dublinparking/) directs attention not only to individual violators
but also a localised spatial setting through the designation of problematic streets.
Contextual convergence through social and mobile media also brings a transition
from users policing the Internet, to users policing through the Internet. Not only do
digital media platforms enact information flows amongst users, many also serve in
practice and often in as news platforms that report and offer commentary on DVevents.
Platforms like Reddit may serve an acute role in, following earlier literature on media
and vigilantism, lowering public confidence in states’ abilities to manage crime and
deviance (Davis 2006, p. 65; in Kucera and Mares 2015), emboldening users to become
actively engaged with such offences (Huey et al. 2012, p. 87), and may follow a crime
news media legacy of ‘orchestrating a kind of virtual vigilantism, in which a proxy
audience is constructed to celebrate vengeance against the perpetrators of unmitigated
evil’ (Reiner 2008, p. 5).
DV seeks to identify and shame unmitigated evil in embodied contexts, yet it also
maintains an earlier digital media culture focus on online infractions. Thus, it reflects an
often-negative assessment of digital media practices, including related phenomena such
as cyber-bullying. Cyber-bullying refers to when users (typically youngsters) harass
and intimidate other users through digital media. This poses a challenge for researchers
and all stakeholders: DVand cyber-bullying are conceptually similar, as both are forms
of online persecution. Yet DV can come as a response to cyber-bullying. For example,
following the 2012 suicide of Canadian teenager Amanda Todd, an online community
sought and published the personal details of the alleged bully (CBC 2012). While DV
may be similar to cyber-bullying, it is often framed in terms of a moral compass (which
may betray nationalist, racist, sexist or xenophobic tendencies). Both phenomena are
related to media education, in that awareness of risks and guidelines are key to
managing these problems. Subsequent research should further a theoretically and
empirically grounded understanding of DV that situates it in relation to cyber-bullying,
in order to address both issues as a matter of public policy and media education.
4 User/Citizen-Led Vigilantism as Critical Reinforcement of Law
and Order
Vigilantism is framed as a kind of ‘private violence’ (Culberson 1990) or everyday
policing (Burr and Jensen 2004) whereby citizens seek to assert their own form of
criminal justice. Whereas the state is said to hold a monopoly on violent activity,
through vigilantism citizens deny this state monopoly in an attempt to legitimate their
own violent acts. In the case of digital media, this legitimation is explicitly posted as
text, image and video content. Vigilantism more generally is typically fuelled by
lowered public confidence in police and criminal justice (Haas et al. 2014), and in
particular tends to follow a rhetoric that openly exhibits a ‘disdain for due process’
(Martin 2009, p. 147) notably in the wake of high-profile crimes. For example, the
emergence of the Guardian Angels in the USAwas a response to outrage following the
murder of Catherine ‘Kitty’ Genovese in 1964. Police may stand as target of criticism,
but more generally the role of the state, and the boundaries of acceptable state
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intervention are scrutinized and contested by individual non-state actors. However,
parallel developments such as neighbourhood watch programmes shared the Guardian
Angels’ desire for citizen-led safety, albeit with mutually endorsing relations with
police and the state (Johnston 1996).
In terms of the role of emerging media, we may consider how independent outlets
offer a perceivably more accurate extent of crime (Davis 2006). Lowered confidence in
state actors is bound to a diminished control over information exchange amongst these
actors. This is especially noticeable in comparatively public and visible facets of
criminal justice, such as police work. Thompson (2005, p. 31) reports on how emerging
technologies coupled with shifts in both political and journalistic cultures contributes to
a ‘new world of mediated visibility’ that complicates conventional attempts to restrict
or control information flows. Heightened visibility of scandal is now a general condi-
tion for governance, and policing in particular (Goldsmith 2010). In addition to
publicizing and circulating critiques of police procedure, so too may DV campaigns
target other institutional actors that are perceived to be complicit in the neglect of
criminal justice. In the case of cyber-bullying and revenge porn, social platforms as
well as telecommunications companies may come under criticism for failing to react to
such crimes occurring through their infrastructure (Wilkinson 2009). DV campaigns are
partly an expression of frustration towards visible evidence of police neglect and
misconduct, but also in response to the functional opacity of platforms in which many
crimes are either mediated or manifest. Such a desire to intervene in both the policing
and securitisation of digital media stands as a pushback against the ‘cherished goal of
many engineers to get the humans out of the loop’ of securitization and monitoring
practices (Marx 2013, p. 57).
While both DV and conventional vigilantism are typically framed as a critical
response against the state, DV’s relation to a given state’s socio-political climate is
more complex, and often is ultimately supportive of the state and the enactment of law
and order. Vigilantism is typically understood as extra-state, popular and extra-legal,
yet it takes on ‘state-like performances such as security enforcement’ along with ‘a
perpetual renegotiation of the boundaries between state and society’ (Burr and Jensen
2004, p. 144). Vigilantism does not mark a rupture from state and policing, but rather a
renegotiation of acceptable boundaries, citizens acting in a way they believe the state
should, to an extent blurs the boundaries between state and populist action (Lund
2001). Vigilantism in this context involves a criticism of state performance, alongside
an alignment with state objectives. While lacking state authorization, vigilante groups
‘do not perceive their actions as over-riding or transgressing the legal order but
construct themselves as self-anointed guardians rescuing national sovereignty, citizen-
ship and the law’s moral sanctity, from cultural elites, moneyed interests, inept bureau-
crats and a sclerotic state’. (Walsh 2014, p. 13). DV thus raises a curious dynamic in
public perception of—and intervention in—policing, as participants may enact national
sovereignty and citizenship on digital media that by definition exceed the scope and
jurisdiction of any nation. While this complicates attempts by police to investigate
crimes through social media (Trottier 2015), users and DV participants in particular
may nevertheless expect some kind of (self-)policing of and through these platforms.
As many users are immersed in a digital media culture that implicitly or explicitly
prescribes self-policing online, the gradual dissolution of online/offline distinctions
may lead to users employing a kind of self-reliant approach when embodied crimes and
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transgressions are mediated (Huey et al. 2012). This dynamic is most notable in cases
where the perceived crime retains an online dimension, as in cases of cyber-bullying or
revenge porn. As a transgression that many users perceive as criminal, it holds
relatively little legal meaning, and police are sceptical or simply understaffed and
unable to respond to such cases (Broll and Huey 2015). If cyber-bullying and revenge
porn stand as prominent harms in contemporary digital media culture, they may
contribute to a perceived vacuum of many institutions failing to address crime in which
digital vigilantism emerges (Oomen 2004, p. 156).
DV is situated in a broader media culture of other types of civilian linkages with
policing and ‘non-rule-based contributions to governance’ (Powell 2011, p. 1), and in
practice may rely on the same hardware, practices and cultural expectations. These
activities include the outsourcing of vigilante activities to ‘informal security agencies’
that are analogous to private security agencies for those who cannot afford these
services (Kucera and Mares 2015, p. 179). These groups typically maintain cooperative
relations with the state, for example, by handing over detained culprits to the police.
More broadly, DV may be linked to ‘a growing neoliberal trend in citizen
responsibilisation’ (Warren 2009, p. 275). While states may not willingly support
vigilantism, recent trends in policing are indicative of nodal governance between
government, law enforcement, private industry and the general public, whereby the
latter are engaged in ‘voluntary ad hoc partnerships with law enforcement’ (Huey et al.
2012, p. 83). In the context of border control, the enlistment of private individuals in
official gatekeeping efforts (Walsh 2014, p. 1) generates three modalities (deputisation,
responsibilisation and autonomisation), each with distinct state-citizen relations as well
as a distinction between users being ‘invited en masse’ and cases where gathering and
distributing information about targets is ‘self-appointed and unauthorised, even if
tacitly accepted’ (ibid., 6). States play a role in designation and sanctioning of vigilan-
tism, either condoning or condemning citizen-led policing. It is also worth noting that
the term vigilante may be invoked as label by state against those without at least tacit
approval, such that prominent members of specific communities can avoid being
labelled as such (Martin 2009, p. 143). By designating those who may be regarded
as a liability as vigilantes may be a way for state to police the boundaries of policing.
Sanctioned and unsanctioned user-led contributions to policing suggest ‘a potential
collision’ (Marx 2013, p. 56) between the exercise of public civic virtue and ‘the
ambiguated citizen-officer-suspect’ that can bypass ‘legal restraints and other judicial
obstacles that somewhat hinder official state surveillance efforts’ (Reeves 2012,
p. 245).
DV complicates citizenship through the blurring of boundaries between police and
public, as well as through the enactment of national identities and hegemonic cultural
values through digital media. Through mediated and ‘glocalised’ (Wellman 2002)
outrage and the sustained visibility of perpetrators, DV campaigns exercise a kind of
us/them identity reflecting a ‘hegemonic bloc, rallying conservative factions’ within
society (Oomen 2004, p. 155). Conventional vigilantism is typically bound to a single
nation, and often reflects nationalist identity building (Kucera and Mares 2015). This
can be seen through the use of nationalist and xenophobic rhetoric, for example, white
nationalism amongst Ku Klux Klan members in the USA. Yet due to the coupling of
digital media and vigilantism, distance is no longer a barrier in vigilantism or nationalist
manifestations (Dennis 2008, p. 356). The backlash to the 2011 Vancouver riot made a
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clear distinction between a local ‘us’ based in downtown Vancouver and an outsider
‘them’ relegated to the outer suburbs (Schneider and Trottier 2012), even though
participants in the campaign themselves were not geographically restricted. Further-
more, DV campaigns may indeed challenge conventional identity-based movements,
such as when Anonymous sought to openly identify a thousand KKK members (CBC
2015).
This violence resembles a kind of citizen-led communication counter-power
(Castells 2007). In particular, groups like Anonymous appear to pose a challenge to
conventional state power (Coleman 2012; Fuchs 2013). Yet the connection between
state power and DV is unclear, and forces a reconsideration of state-citizen relations.
While there is empowering and emancipatory potential in terms of citizen use of digital
media technology, vigilante engagement of digital media also occurs alongside police
and other branches of the state asserting greater control over digital media. Vigilantism
is commonly understood as a challenge to monopolisation of state power, but also as a
reproduction of that power, as police and state power assert greater control over digital
media. This is seen through the publishing of guidelines and strategies, as well as legal
clarifications and technical enhancement of police practice on digital platforms. Thus, if
citizens are empowered in their use of digital media users, states are ‘power users’
through their ability to aggregate data, target groups and individuals, and partner with
private companies that manage these platforms (Trottier 2014).
5 Surveillance and User-Led Regimes of Visibility
Compared to conventional vigilantism, DV makes explicit use of targets’ personal
information by rendering them visible to public scrutiny. It is informed by
(self-)surveillant tendencies located within the contemporary practice of citizenship
and policing through digital media. Surveillance implies watching over others, and can
be performed by individuals as well as organisations. David Lyon succinctly refers to
surveillance as ‘processes in which special note is taken of certain human behaviours
that go well beyond idle curiosity’ (2007, p. 13). Surveillance processes can be broken
up into discrete steps: the collection of personal data, the interpretation of that data and
social consequences stemming from that assessment. This distinction is important due
to temporal as well as contextual gaps between these steps, notably as digital media
allow surveillance practices to traverse these gaps. Contemporary surveillance is
located in police practices (Marx 1988), emerging technologies such as CCTV cameras
and national identity card regimes (Norris and Armstrong 1999; Lyon 2009), as well as
micro-level interactions to manage one’s identity (Goffman 1959). These contextually
disparate practices share a tendency to collect and repurpose information about
social actors. Gathering personal information is a prevalent organisational logic
contemporary governments and institutions (Dandeker 1990). Surveillance is ubiq-
uitous, not just because of seemingly ever-present digital technologies, but because
watching and assessing pervade ‘virtually every enduring social relationship’ (Rule
2011: 64). While the prevalence of domesticated (Silverstone and Haddon 1996)
digital media provides an infrastructure for DV, these depend primarily on inter-
personal practices of self-scrutiny and lateral-scrutiny (Andrejevic 2005; Author
2012). Thus, even in maintaining a conceptual distinction between seemingly
Digital Vigilantism as Weaponisation of Visibility 65
neutral monitoring practices and surveillance, it is important to note that informa-
tion yielded in the former can supplement the latter, given their coexistence on a
pervasive digital media landscape.
The convergence of formerly distinct surveillance regimes amplifies the ability to
both gather and in turn distribute personal information. This includes merging data-
bases and individual profiles through technological innovation such as converging
functionality in hardware or software platforms (Jenkins 2006) or as a result post 9–
11 legislation (ex: the 2001 USA PATRIOT Act; Canada’s Bill C-51). Such develop-
ments facilitate surveillant assemblages (Haggerty and Ericson 2000) that can produce
wide-reaching profiles of targeted individuals through temporarily sustained partner-
ships between social actors. Social media platforms and mobile devices in particular
amount to a ‘mutual augmentation’ of formerly distinct surveillance and information
sharing practices (Trottier 2012b). Thus, the fact that DV takes place on these platforms
and devices means that it is not only the product of a general informational convergence
but that it can also further amplify other forms of surveillance, such as when a potential
employer or border agent searches for personal information about a DV target, and
finds evidence of the DV campaign and their offending act.
In assessing the societal impact of surveillance, privacy is typically invoked as an
individual and collective right ‘to determine for themselves when, how and to what
extent information about them is communicated to others’ (Westin 1967, p. 337), as
well as to simply be ‘let alone’ (Warren and Brandeis 1890). Privacy is also as a cultural
value that is redefined and performed through everyday social interactions, for exam-
ple, by managing secrecy and evading unwanted exposure in everyday mediated and
embodied contexts (Nippert-Eng 2010). A common feature to both legally and cultur-
ally bound definitions of privacy is the implication of control over personal information
flows, a quality that has been greatly complicated with the advent of digital media. DV
highlights the complex nature of privacy and public space. It is a private form of
violence that at the outset marks a severe privacy violation for the targeted individual.
Yet it takes place in platforms that constitute a potential public sphere (Fuchs 2014),
even if these are privately owned, and tempered through privacy settings.
DV represents the intersection of digital media culture and contemporary citizenship
and policing. In practice, it is informed by existing individually led surveillance that
also draw from digital media affordances. In order to understand this culture of
mediated policing, it bears reflecting on contemporary practices of managing visibility,
including self-visibility. Following historical accounts of surveillance practices that
complicate a typical top-down watcher/watched dichotomy (Le Roy Ladurie 1978),
digital media affordances and practices inform several subject positions that in turn
inform DV practices. Not only are these perspectives stemming from the possibility of
data collection being folded into everyday activities through digital media (Marx 2013)
but they also indicate a lack of agency when it comes to managing one’s own visibility.
DV campaigns are by definition unwanted forms of visibility. Yet in terms of informa-
tion they build upon, they are not entirely distinct from the voluntary disclosure of
information, or the celebration of transparent forms of social engagement (Brin 1998).
Participatory surveillance refers to a process whereby social media users knowingly
share information about themselves, and derive some form of empowerment from this
sharing (Albrechtslund 2008; Cascio 2005). This perspective serves as a helpful
intervention to scholarly accounts that assume that users unknowingly violate their
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privacy when uploading content to social platforms. Indeed, users often yield specific
pleasures and values from online sharing, for example, when sharing their exercise
details with an online community, alongside other types of life-logging (O’Hara et al.
2008). However, a conceptual as well as practical concern is whether it is possible for a
user to fully consent to sharing personal data, given the volatility of platforms, users
and mediating devices. As unanticipated risks become embedded in public awareness,
we can imagine that these are factored in as a kind of transaction cost associated with
participatory surveillance. Thus, an individual may voluntarily disclose information
about their workplace and family life, under the guise of empowering visibility. Upon
being targeted by a DV campaign, disclosures that were originally a form of empow-
erment and self-actualization could contribute to further social harm.
As a further departure from the typical watcher/watched framework, sousveillance
(Mann et al. 2003) refers to a reversal of the surveillant gaze, whereupon relatively
powerless social actors watch (typically recording and transmitting footage of) a more
powerful actor. Such practices are linked to recent political movements including
Edward Snowden and Chelsea Manning’s revelations about government surveillance
schemes, as well as cop-watching initiatives (the latter of which takes advantage of
social media to render police misconduct visible). While mobile devices and social
platforms are used in key political interventions, scholars may question how these uses
contest or confirm power differentials. In the case of cop-watching initiatives, consider
police adoption of body-worn cameras that provide a more authoritative account of the
same incidents (Brucato 2015; Sandhu and Haggerty 2016). Such tendencies to seek
out and transmit injustices may easily slip to instances where a power differential is less
apparent. As an example, consider the difference between filming a case of police
harassing a citizen, and filming a case of a citizen harassing a fellow citizen.
Sousveillance is situated in a cultural context where individuals are vigilant firstly
towards the self, and secondly towards others (Mann et al. 2003; Dennis 2008, pp. 348–
9). Self-scrutiny and scrutiny of others are inextricably linked in contemporary digital
media culture.
Under the rubric of empowerment and self-care, users may feel an obligation to
watch over their peers. Lateral surveillance refers to a broader cultural condition of
individuals monitoring the conduct of other individuals (Andrejevic 2005). As this
concept is not limited to social media platforms, it underlines a broader media culture
characterised by a lack of trust in the other, coupled with a media savvy that compels
individuals to bypass self-presentation through a series of techniques and technologies,
including nanny cams and home drug test kits. As so much social interaction now
occurs online, it stands to reason that interpersonal interactions are also shaped by this
kind of media savvy. A social dynamic that crosscuts the above three concepts is that
individuals are watching over other individuals, along with watching over themselves.
This implies a broader attempt at control over information flows, and an assertion of
informational autonomy. It also speaks to a blurring of the boundary that would
otherwise distinguish socializing and surveillance, as both now involve the asynchro-
nous overview of aggregated personal data on social platforms. Thus, persecution of
others through DV may be remotely or quite tangibly informed by a culture of
‘survivalist individualism’ (Andrejevic 2007), whereby self-preservation in any range
of contexts depends on watch over others, and publically revealing inconsistent or
discrediting behaviours. Consider cohabitation-based reality TV shows where both
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contestants and viewers are encouraged to catch other contestants engaged in dishonest
and immoral behaviour (Andrejevic 2005). Likewise, migrants seeking to escape
scrutiny and persecution in a hostile environment may watch over fellow migrants,
and intervene by excommunicating those deemed to be a liability (Madsen 2006).
These subject positions inform routine forms of interpersonal interaction, as well as
exceptional coalescence in vigilante campaigns. They not only mark a domestication of
technologies that render the self and others visible but also the possibility that the
distribution of personal information can become an ‘explicit strategy of individuals
who know very well that mediated visibility can be a weapon in the struggles they
wage in their day-to-day lives’ (Thompson 2005, p. 31). DV is distinguished from
conventional vigilantism through its primary reliance on weaponised visibility for
social change as well as social harm. In the case of the Kopschopper incident in the
Netherlands, two of the assailants received lesser sentences from the court, on the basis
of the social visibility to which they had already been subjected (RTL Nieuws 2013).
DV constitutes a severe violation of the targeted individual’s privacy and data protec-
tion rights, as their personal details are publicly transmitted without their consent.
Targets may be selected on the basis of gender and ethnicity. DValso amounts to a kind
of criminal justice response that is performed by untrained non-professionals. It
challenges police process, and it can undermine perceptions of authority and statehood,
while reproducing the worst abuses of state-sanctioned violence. DV is typically
manifest as a series of crimes, including harassment, stalking and uttering death threats.
Citizens learn to minimise self-harm in terms of uploading their own personal infor-
mation, but to what extent are they taught not to put others in harm’s way? It is crucial
that media literacy guidelines teach citizens to recognise the harms in these tendencies.
6 Conclusion
When vigilantism is expressed through digital media, it seeks and circulates targeted
offenders’ personal information. The purpose of these acts is both informational in the
sharing of details about transgressions, but also punitive in the type of visibility wilfully
enacted against the target. DV groups typically act in defiance of police, and police
typically condemn and prosecute vigilante activity. Yet these relations may resemble a
more nodal form of governance, for example when Toronto police reach out to DV
hacking communities in order to identify those responsible for the Ashley Madison data
breach (Smith Cross 2015). Such potential partnerships may comply with recommen-
dations that police crowdsource the search for data, but not actual investigations
(Ackerman 2013), while others believe that both are feasible with effective safeguards
(Brabham 2013). In either case, the possibility that social actors appropriate police
appeals as a means to harm others remains an area of concern for surveillance studies.
These developments suggest that DV should not be regarded as an aberration from
other digital media practices, but instead located on a continuum of forms of user-led
policing and citizenship.
Social media platforms like Facebook and Twitter are default platforms for inter-
personal, but also collective activities. These tendencies are not the sole remit of any
single activist or militant organisation. Rather, they are a tendency that can potentially
emerge through online communication. DV is also an unmistakably global
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phenomenon. In North America, the online response to the 2011 Vancouver riot and the
2013 Boston bombing manhunt profoundly impacted the lives of those who were
(wrongly) targeted, and received substantial media coverage. Within the EU, groups
like Letzgo Hunting and Facebook’s Association of Citizens Saint Sava mark a reliance
on digital media for targeting child exploiters and drug dealers. Likewise, the ‘human
flesh search engine’ in China has featured prominently in public discourse about the
Internet (Cheung 2009). In the wake of civil unrest, the MENA region has seen the rise
of groups that use digital media to monitor, report and co-ordinate against crimes,
including sexual violence. Subsequent research will contribute to conceptual clarity
about DV in relation to other user-led practices on digital media. This rests heavily on a
theoretically informed understanding of DV, as well as its overlaps with existing
phenomena. This will depend on empirical attention to groups, along with media
representations of groups, including on hybrid social news platforms such as Reddit
and GeenStijl that simultaneously serve as platforms where these campaigns are
manifest. These developments also mark a categorical blurring between online and
offline engagements, local and global participants and contexts, positive as well as
between critical public perception, personal details and public interest.
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